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In “Speech acts, fallacies and dialogue systems”, Olena Yaskorska presents the 
guidelines of a model of dialogical logic aimed at grappling with both formal and 
informal fallacies. This model results from the integration of two traditions within 
formal approaches to dialogue models: on the one hand, Lorenzen’s dialogical logic, 
and on the other, Prakken’s formal systems for persuasion dialogue. The aim of 
Yaskorska’s project is to provide a formal framework for analyzing real moves 
within argumentative dialogues, which is something that, in her view, Prakken’s 
model is able to do, while preserving participant’s ability to assess the justificatory 
force of their arguments, which is something that, in her view Lorenzen’s model is 
able to do. 
 My main worry about Yaskorska’s project is precisely the latter claim, 
namely, that Lorenzen’s model is adequate to determine the justificatory force of 
arguments. I will present two qualms: a general one having to do, mainly, with 
Lorenzen’s achievements, and a particular one concerning Yaskorska’s actual 
proposal. 
 
2.  A GENERAL CONCERN 
 
Yaskorska agrees with van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) that an adequate 
model of argumentative dialogue must be able to deal with the way in which, in 
actual exchanges, the antagonist may challenge not only the premises that the 
protagonist has used, but also their justificatory force. Indeed, Pragma-dialectics’s 
rule 6b, says that the antagonist may always attack a point of view by questioning 
either the propositional content or the justificatory force of the protagonist’s 
argument. 
 As Yaskorska observes, by itself, this rule does not say anything about the 
way in which such a challenge is to be handled. In her words: 
 
The pragma-dialectical system requires that the protagonist uses rules of some logic 
to defend his reasoning, but it does not provide a formal account of dialogues 





However, as a criticism against Pragma-dialectics, this observation results a 
bit hasty and paradoxical at the same time: as it is well-known, Pragma-dialectics 
adopted precisely Lorenzen’s dialogical logic – and in particular, its development by 
Barth & Krabbe (1982) – as a framework for determining the logical validity of the 
arguments employed by any of the parties. 
For my part, I have doubts on whether Lorenzen’s model is a good 
instrument for testing the validity of everyday arguments, that is, arguments in 
which ordinary connectives have the usual truth-functional interpretation that 
allows monological assessments, instead of the constructivist interpretation that 
Lorenzen proposes. I will not get into this issue here, but just point out that, if this is 
a problem for Pragma-dialectics, it is also a problem for Yaskorska’s overall project.  
On the other hand, checking validity as conceived by classical logic is not the 
same as checking justificatory force. Actually, it is not the same as checking 
inferential goodness. For the truth is that non-deductive and non-formal inferences, 
which, at first sight, seem to be predominant in everyday argumentation, get very 
poor assessments within classical models. And in this respect, Pragma-dialectics 
would be better equipped to assess the justificatory force of the reasons adduced by 
any of the parties in an argumentative dialogue. After all, Pragma-dialectics states 
both a validity rule and an argument scheme rule prescribing that: 
 
1) Validity rule 
A party may only use arguments in its argumentation that are logically valid or 
capable of being made logically valid by making explicit one or more unexpressed 
premises. 
 
2) Argument scheme rule 
A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does 
not take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly 
applied. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).  
 
That is, regarding the assessment of the justificatory force of reasons 
constituting different types of defeasible inferences, Lorenzen’s logic has nothing on 
offer, apart from the trivial strategy of turning the corresponding arguments into 
enthymemes. Contrastingly, Pragma-dialectics has the resource of considering 
whether or not an adequate argument schema has been correctly applied. Thus, it 
seems that Pragma-dialectics would have already achieved that which seems to be 
the main goal of Yaskorska’s project, namely, to provide a model for the assessment 
of everyday argumentative exchanges, able to integrate the conception of logical 
validity that underlies Lorenzen’s proposal –i.e., a conception according to which 
classical logical calculus (or something close to it) results from the rules that 
determine the type of moves that a proponent and an opponent in a dialogue may 
make, while dealing with other types of justificatory force that premises are able to 
confer to standpoints, namely, the justificatory force that results from the correct 
utilization of adequate argument schemas. And Pragma-dialectics would do this in 
the framework of a speech-act conception of argumentation. So, where would the 




I guess that a response could be: Yaskorska’s model is fully formal, something 
tractable in a highly systematic way. On the contrary, there is no computable model 
for Pragma-dialectics. But, is this a real gain? After all, we cannot deal in a purely 
recursive way with actual speech-acts. Interpreting and analyzing actual speech-acts 
and argumentative moves in terms of the elements of a particular formal model 
does not seem straightforward or systematic either. For even if we think of 
argumentative speech-acts in terms of the conditions and consequences of making 
certain moves in a dialogue, which is Prakken’s conception of argumentative 
speech-acts and also Yaskorska’s, the question of determining whether a particular 
move is answerable to this or that norm –that is, the question of determining which 
type of speech-act has taken place- is a matter of heuristics and interpretation. (Not 
to mention the question of dealing with non-literal and indirect speech-acts and all 
its rhetorical implications for the adjudication of a persuasive dialogue). 
But this is too broad a criticism for my part; so broad indeed as to suspect 
that there is some talking past each other going on here. So let me consider now a 
very, very particular worry. 
 
3. YASKORSKA’S ACTUAL PROPOSAL 
 
Of course, Yaskorska’s presentation here is only a sketch of her overall project, and 
many details of her actual proposal remain to be explained. For example, we may 
wonder how is relevance and consistency of particular moves to be assessed: is it at 
the level of the rules for dialogues themselves –so that, for example, it is not 
permitted to claim the opposite of something which is already in your own 
commitment store or something that is not already in one of the parties’ 
commitment store- or at the level of parties themselves –so that, for example, there 
is a resolve move that prescribes, for each party, solving its own inconsistencies or 
withdrawing irrelevancies. Also, we may wonder whether the rules are sensible to 
presumptions and burden of proofs, and which are the norms determining how 
turns must switch. 
These are details that remain to be clarified, but I see no reason why they 
couldn’t. Yet, a main problem remains in this presentation. Because Lorenzen 
interprets disjunction, that is, “alternative” AvB as a move to be attacked by 
questioning whether AvB and to be defended by putting forward A or by putting 
forward B, Yaskorska constructs the speech act of argumentation for a disjunction in 
Prakken’s model this way: 
 
(L3) Argumentation φ since ψ is performed when a player defends AvB , then φ is a 
formula AvB and ψ is a set which includes the formula A or the formula B. 
(Yaskorska, 2013: p. 5) 
 
Thus, in her account, defending a disjunction from an attack “why φ”, where 
φ is a sentence AvB is modelled by argumentative act “φ since ψ”, where φ is a 
disjunction and ψ is a sentence A or sentence B. 
However, this way of modelling the defence of a disjunctive formula does 




defend any of the disjuncts but only the disjunction as a whole. Think for example of 
cases in which the disjunction is a tautology: we may be unable to defend that it will 
rain or to defend that it will not rain, but we may be able to defend that it will either 
rain or not rain. 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
Yaskorska’s paper is the presentation of an ambitious and innovative project. Due to 
obvious limitations of space, this presentation can only be a sketch, so that many 
questions remain to be clarified. Nevertheless, her presentation enables us to 
understand the sort of concerns that she aims to address. In this comments, I have 
just tried to suggest that Lorenzen’s model might not be a good basis for this 
endeavour. 
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